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'Believe' as an evidential

Abstrakt: Ann believes every vegan has to supplement B12. Bob says to his vegan friend Carol, whom Ann has never heard of or met in any way: "Ann believes you have to supplement B12." Kyle Blumberg and Harvey Lederman (2021) have proposed a dispositionalist analysis of such revisionist attitude reports: their function is to report what the ascribe would have believed, had they known what we know. I show that their view fails to account for revisionist reports about inanimate objects, and offer an alternative hypothesis capable of doing that. According to my view, revisionist reports function as evidentials: by uttering them, speakers cite the ascriber as the source of evidence about the prejacent. Next, I go a step further and suggest that the default - if not the only - meaning of 'believe' is evidential. While semantically unorthodox, the thesis receives independent support from philosophy of mind and cognitive science.