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*Actions, products, demonstrations*

**Abstract.** As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action–product ambiguity. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly with respect to their forms. The present paper discusses action–product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that embraces both concepts is developed in the paper.

Keywords: demonstratives, demonstrations, demonstrata, action–product distinction, referential intentions

## 1. Two profiles of demonstrations

Jack's utterance of

[1] This green is well balanced between blue and yellow

might be accompanied by several types of pointing actions: he might point at this particular patch of green with a finger; he might use a paintbrush to paint a particular patch of green; he might grasp a particular greenish object and show it to the audience; or he might refrain from any overt action if he believes that the particular shade of green is salient in the context. It might even be claimed (although I won't be defending this view here) that the use of “green” in “this green” is nothing more than a constituent of each of the aforementioned pointing actions. In all these cases, the actions in question play a role of a demonstration, and it seems that the following is true of exophoric uses of demonstratives:

(Heterogeneity) Demonstrations accompanying uses of demonstratives vary with respect to their form.

If *heterogeneity* is true (and it is hardly controversial that it is), then one might ask what unifies varieties of possible actions making them exemplifications of demonstrations. One possible answer to this question is provided by the dual-intention model of demonstrations (Ciecierski & Makowski

(ms.)) according to which all demonstrations are complex actions that have both an *ostensive* and an *intentional* profile.

An ostensive profile of demonstrations comprises any basic behavior that constitutes a demonstration: motor activity of a particular kind (grasping something, pointing with a finger, eye gaze, etc.) or refraining from an overt action. In order to distinguish such basic behaviors from complex acts of demonstration (the former are constituents of the latter), we might refer to them as “indications” or “demonstrations *sensu stricto*” (“demonstrations<sub>s</sub>” for short), reserving the terms such as “demonstrations in the broad sense” and “demonstration<sub>L</sub>” for complex acts of demonstration. *Heterogeneity* assumes, among other things, that the form of a demonstration<sub>L</sub> is inherited from the form of an indication that is its constituent, i.e., that if two indications have different forms, the forms differentiate also between demonstration<sub>L</sub> that contain them as constituents.

An intentional profile of demonstrations comprises at least two elements: an intention to get the interpreter to form a particular hypothesis regarding the reasons why a particular demonstration<sub>s</sub> is performed by the speaker (we might call it “abductive intention”) and the intention to get the interpreter to form, on the basis of this hypothesis, another one regarding the demonstrated object (demonstratum; we might call it “deictic intention”). Both intentions are, just like indications, constituents of every demonstration.

To illustrate the idea: if an utterance of [1] is accompanied by an act of painting a particular patch of green, the act of using the paintbrush in a certain manner is a case of an indication, while the two accompanying intentions are, respectively, the intention to get the interpreter to form a hypothesis that the speaker used the paintbrush in this particular manner in order to single out a particular shade of green and the intention to get the interpreter to form the hypothesis that this particular shade of green is the demonstratum.

In the case of particular demonstrations, of course, the two profiles co-occur, and it is not always easy to tell them apart. However, it should always be in principle possible to single out the ostensive profile by considering, firstly, alternative ostensive interpretations the demonstration<sub>s</sub> might receive and, secondly, the non-ostensive interpretations it might get. As noted by Wittgenstein (1953: 75), it is possible that a person “naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip”; it is also possible to treat the gesture in the manner characteristic of some animals, as not involving ostension at all.

The concept of *demonstration<sub>s</sub>*, however, exhibits action–product ambiguity, to which I shall now turn. As I shall suggest below, the ambiguity is linked to two types of intentions that constitute the intentional profile of demonstrations.

## 2. Action–product distinction

The action–product distinction was introduced by Kasimir Twardowski in 1911 in his seminal paper *Actions and products: Comments on the broader area of psychology, grammar, and logic*. One of Twardowski's main motivations for introducing the distinction was the rejection of psychologism; however, the distinction is philosophically interesting independently of that motivation. In recent years, for instance, it gained some importance in discussions regarding propositions and propositional attitudes (cf. Moltmann, 2013). It has also been extensively exploited in praxiology (cf. Kotarbiński, 1965; Makowski, 2017). As we shall see below, another area where it might find an interesting application are the debates about demonstratives and demonstrations.

Twardowski introduces the action–product distinction by appealing to the difference in the verb–nouns pairs such as:

to jump – the jump

to shout – the shout

to lie – the lie

to judge – the judgment

to think – the thought

to speak – the speech

to cry – the cry.

As he observes:

(...) the relation of the verb to its corresponding noun (...) expresses the relation of some action to what emerges as a result of it, owing to, by means of, that action. When we fight, a fight results; when we think, thoughts arise; when we [issue a] command, a command occurs; when we sing, a song results. (Twardowski, 1911: 14-15)

He dubs “that which arises (...) by means of that action” – “the product” of that action (*ibidem*). Hence, the jump is the product of jumping, the shout is the product of shouting, the lie is the product of lying, the judgment is the product of judging, the thought is the product of thinking, etc. By the same token, we might say that the indication (demonstration<sub>s</sub>) is the product of indicating (demonstrating<sub>s</sub>).

The action–product distinction, however, is not a simple by-product of the verb–noun

distinction. As Twardowski notes, immediately in some cases the nouns themselves suffer from action–product ambiguity:

(...) there is no question that we also frequently make use of a noun for designating an action, which renders these nouns ambiguous, capable as they are of designating now actions, now their products. In the phrase “to take someone’s advice,” the term “advice” denotes the product of the activity of advising, but when we say: “It’s no use giving you advice,” we wish to express the sentiment that the activity of offering advice has met with difficulties. (Twardowski, 1911: 15-16)

Twardowski’s main argument for the distinction must be, therefore, independent of the linguistic motivations that are behind it. And this is indeed the case: the ground for the distinction is that actions and products have different properties, although in some cases, as Twardowski stresses, it might be difficult to clearly separate a particular action from its product.<sup>1</sup> For instance, truth and falsity might be properties of thoughts (products) but not properties of thinking (actions), the plan but not the action of planning might be implemented, etc. Generally, actions, in contrast to products, do not have fulfillment or satisfaction conditions (Gerner, 2017: 325). Moreover, all stable (“enduring,” in Twardowski's terminology) products differ with respect to their temporal extension from the corresponding actions. Finally, at least *prima facie*, the sameness relation might connect products but not actions (Gerner, 2017: 326), as it makes no sense to talk about Jill's jumping being identical to Kate's, while we might truly say that Jill's jump was identical to Kate's.

Following (and slightly modifying) the suggestion of Brandl (1998), we might represent the ambiguity in terms of Davidsonian event-semantics. The sentence

[2] John is taking a walk

might be interpreted either as (action-directed reading)<sup>2</sup>

[2A]  $\exists e[\text{Walking}(e) \wedge \text{Agent}(\text{John}, e)]$

or as (product-directed reading)

1 As Brandl (1998) notes: there are at least two possible interpretations of Twardowski's considerations. The first requires a categorial ontological difference between actions and products according to which actions and products constitute inseparable wholes but might be nevertheless distinguished conceptually as distinct entities. The second requires a difference in meaning without a difference in reference and ontology. Here I am assuming (contrary to Brandl’s suggestions) the correctness of the first interpretation.

2 I leave open the question of whether  $e$  and  $x$  range over a single category of entities (events).

[2P]  $\exists e \exists x [\text{Walking}(e) \wedge \text{Agent}(\text{John}, e) \wedge \text{Walk}(x) \wedge \text{Product}(x, e)]$ .

Similar differences can be found in the case of indications qua actions and indications qua products. The former might be a subject matter of psychological explanation (“Why she behaved like this, i.e., why she performed this particular act of indication?”), while nothing similar applies to the latter (the question “Why did the particular indication qua product occur?” is not the question about the psychological factors responsible for the occurrence of a particular event).

Additional support for the applicability of the distinction to cases of indications comes from modal considerations. Consider, for instance, the following scenario (de Gaynesford, 2008: 169):

[The actual scenario] The speaker points with a finger towards a horse (A) but another horse (B) replaces A during the utterance of “that’s my horse” when the speaker closes her eyes for a second.

And contrast it with the following one:

[The counterfactual scenario] The speaker points with a finger towards a horse (A) during the utterance of “that’s my horse”. She closes her eyes for a second but no other horse replaces A during pointing.

In the first case, a certain demonstration qua product (DP1) and a certain demonstration<sub>s</sub> qua action (DA1) co-occur, while in the second scenario the very same demonstration qua action (DA1) is accompanied by a different demonstration qua product (DP2). At least in some cases, therefore, a demonstration qua action might co-occur with a distinct demonstration qua product.

If we agree that the distinction is well-founded, we are entitled to claim that (following the idea of Reichenbach and others (cf. Ciecierski (2020)) we are using token quotes “*x*”<sup><l, t></sup> that refer to a particular token of an expression *x* having a particular spatiotemporal characteristics marked as <l, t>):

[3] Jill is performing a demonstration<sub>s</sub> (an indication) while uttering “*this*”<sup><l, t></sup> .

We might receive the following two readings:

[3A]  $\exists e[\text{Indicating}(e) \wedge \text{Agent}(\text{Jill}, e) \wedge \text{Time}(\mathbf{t}, e) \wedge \text{Utters}(\text{Jill}, \text{“this”}^{\langle 1, \triangleright \rangle}, \mathbf{t})]$

[3P]  $\exists e \exists x[\text{Indicating}(e) \wedge \text{Agent}(\text{Jill}, e) \wedge \text{Time}(\mathbf{t}, e) \wedge \text{Utters}(\text{Jill}, \text{“this”}^{\langle 1, \triangleright \rangle}, \mathbf{t}) \wedge \text{Indication}(x) \wedge \text{Product}(x, e)]$

corresponding, respectively, to action-directed reading of [3] and product-directed reading of [3]<sup>3</sup>.

Twardowski (1911: 15) offers a three-fold distinction in the domain of products and actions: some actions and products are physical, some are mental, and some are psychophysical (“those in which a physical action is accompanied by a mental one.”). Although we do not have to strictly follow Twardowski here, it might be useful to note that a distinction between demonstrations<sub>L</sub> as complex entities constituted by demonstrations<sub>S</sub>, and intentions and demonstrations<sub>S</sub> themselves correspond to the distinction between psychophysical actions and products (demonstrations<sub>L</sub>) and the physical actions and products (demonstrations<sub>S</sub>).

### 3. Demonstrata: potential, intended and actual

The idea of a dual profile of demonstrations (and uses of demonstratives in general) might be exploited in several ways in the theory of demonstrative utterances. One which I would like to briefly describe in this paper looks as follows. Within the ostensive profile of demonstrations, indications qua products — as having satisfaction conditions — contribute *candidates* for the object demonstrated (*potential* demonstrata), while the intentional profile of demonstration contributes the intended demonstratum. Now what is the *actual* demonstratum depends on the relation between the two.

Here is one way of developing the idea: if the intended demonstratum is on the list of potential demonstrata, then it is the actual demonstratum. If it is not, then, depending on how big the class of potential demonstrata is, there is no actual demonstratum or the demonstratum is the only object that is the potential demonstratum (in cases where demonstration<sub>S</sub> contributes a single object). Here is another: if the intended demonstratum is on the list of potential demonstrata, then it is the actual demonstratum. If it is not, then there is no actual demonstratum. The first analysis follows the intuition of those who believe that demonstration and intention are jointly decisive for demonstrative reference but who also claim that in controversial cases demonstration might take over and become a decisive factor (we might call this position “weak demonstrativism” to coin a term for those who treat demonstrations as decisive). The other analysis follows weak intentionalism, the idea that a speaker's intentions determine the reference of a demonstrative, but

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3 Action-product ambiguity applies here also to the notion of utterance – I am ignoring it for the sake of presentation.

only if he or she selects one of the potential demonstrata. The two options are not the only available: one might dwell more on a more radical intentionalism or demonstrativism (see below).<sup>4</sup>

Last but not least, the actual demonstratum (if there is one) does not have to be the referent of the corresponding demonstrative. In regular cases it has this status, but in the cases of deferred reference such as

[4] This [the speaker shows a copy of *Promise me, dad*] is the current president of the USA<sup>5</sup>

the relation between the actual demonstratum (the copy of the book) and the referent of demonstrative (Joe Biden) is indirect (cf. Nunberg, 1993).

This idea can be implemented into alternative truth conditional analyses of demonstrative utterances in the following manner. Let  $c$  be a context that contains  $s$  as the speaker,  $i$  as the indication qua product,  $D_i$  as the class of potential demonstrata that correspond to  $i$ , and  $D_s$  as the (singleton) class whose only element is the individual the speaker has in mind. Let us also ignore for a moment the cases of deferred reference (their inclusion in the truth-conditional clauses brings no special complications).

For the utterance  $u$  of “This is F,” we have the following *weakly demonstrativistic* truth conditions:

(Weak demonstrativism)

$u$  is true in  $c$  that contains  $s$ ,  $i$ ,  $D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff (i) every  $x$  in  $D_i \cap D_s$  is F and  $D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset$  or (ii) every  $x$  in  $D_i$  is F and  $D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset$  and  $|D_i| = 1$ .

$u$  is false in  $c$  that contains  $s$ ,  $i$ ,  $D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff (i) every  $x$  in  $D_i \cap D_s$  is not F and  $D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset$  or (ii) every  $x$  in  $D_i$  is not F and  $D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset$  and  $|D_i| = 1$ .

$u$  lacks truth value in  $c$  that contains  $s$ ,  $i$ ,  $D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff  $D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset$  and  $|D_i| > 1$ .

and the following *weakly intentionalistic* truth conditions:

(Weak intentionalism)

$u$  is true in  $c$  that contains  $s$ ,  $i$ ,  $D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_i \cap D_s$  is F and  $D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset$ .

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4 For a discussion regarding the role of intentions and demonstrations in truth conditional interpretation of demonstrative utterances, see Reimer (1991), Bach (1992), Roberts (1997), Perry (2009), King (2014), Radulescu (2019), and Leth (2020).

5 Following Kaplan (1989), the description within the brackets is a description of a demonstration, i.e., it is not a part of what is said.

$u$  is false in  $c$  that contains  $s, i, D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_i \cap D_s$  is not F and  $D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset$ .

$u$  lacks truth value in  $c$  that contains  $s, i, D_i$  and  $D_s$  iff  $D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset$ .

In contrast, the *strong version of demonstrativism* looks as follows:

(Strong demonstrativism)

$u$  is true in  $c$  that contains  $s$  and  $D_i$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_i$  is F and  $|D_i| = 1$ .

$u$  is false in  $c$  that contains  $D_s$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_i$  is not F and  $|D_i| = 1$ .

$u$  lacks truth value in  $c$  that contains  $s$  and  $D_s$  iff  $D_i = \emptyset$  or  $|D_i| > 1$ .

while the *strong version of intentionalism* is as follows:

(Strong intentionalism)

$u$  is true in  $c$  that contains  $s, i, D_s$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_s$  is F.

$u$  is false in  $c$  that contains  $s, i, D_s$  iff every  $x$  in  $D_s$  is not F.

The choice of a particular theory here depends on additional philosophical arguments and motivations that I shall not offer in this paper. The point I want to make here is that the analysis of demonstrations in terms of intentional and ostensive profiles and introduction of the idea of indications qua products is compatible with various truth conditional theories of demonstrative utterances. Note that even in the case of strong intentionalism, the intention concerns the object demonstrated by means of a particular indication and, as such, cannot be separated completely from the latter. This makes room for additional considerations regarding potential constraints that the form of the indication might impose on the respective intention.

With the exception of strong intentionalism, all the analyses presented above make some use of the concept of potential demonstratum. The general (and imprecise) intuition is that:

Demonstrations<sub>S</sub> qua products along with some presuppositions regarding the relevance of particular factors determine potential demonstrata.

Consider, for instance, the following scenario (a modified version of the example discussed by Reimer, 1991):

Suppose that Peter grabs a bunch of keys from his desk while saying “These are mine”. The bunch actually contains some keys that are Peter’s and some that are not.

Here the list of potential demonstrata comprises all the sub-collections of keys from the bunch grasped by Peter. The relevant factors concern the presuppositions regarding the rationale behind Peter's behavior (his aims and plans).

Or consider the following scenario:

I am sitting on Venice beach on a crowded holiday looking south, with swarms of people in sight. I fix my attention on a woman in the distance, and, intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely to the south, say “She is athletic”. (King, 2014: 224)

Here the list of potential demonstrata comprises all the females visible within the scope of the vague gesture. The relevant factors, again, concern the presuppositions regarding the rationale behind the speaker's behavior. Such a presupposition determines that we are talking about persons visible within the scope of the gesture who have a certain gender.

Consider, finally, a scenario inspired by one of John Perry's (1997) examples:

Someone utters the sentence of the language EL\*: “That fish was yea big,” which differs from English only in that EL\* contains the expression “yea,” which conventionally always refers to the distance between the hands of the speaker. While uttering the expression, the speaker is making a suitable gesture.

Here the list of potential demonstrata contains a single element being a particular length. The relevant factor here is that we are employing a certain (strict) linguistic convention that precisely determines the relation between the gesture and the object demonstrated.

#### 4. Pragmatic filter

Let us call the mechanism of employing certain factors in the process of the determination of potential demonstrata a *pragmatic filter*. The next question I want to address concerns the explication of that concept. I do not want to provide a decisive argument for this or that manner of conceptually engineering a concept, but I would like to describe directions towards which further investigations might proceed.

The first one appeals to the idea of the rational interpreter of a demonstration<sub>s</sub>. According to that approach, potential demonstrata are the objects a rational interpreter might consider as demonstrata when forming the hypothesis explaining the act of indicating. Sometimes there are

many hypotheses at stake, and the approach predicts that the class of potential demonstrata becomes numerous. A rational interpreter, as one might assume, knows the context of an utterance well, including background assumptions shared by the participants at a given stage of the conversations, but excluding the knowledge of the speaker's intentions regarding the intended demonstratum. The latter factor must be excluded because the assumption that the speaker's intention always determines a single object would make all the alternative hypotheses regarding the demonstratum redundant. At the very same time, aims and plans that can be reconciled with the assumptions about the context might be the subject of the knowledge of a rational interpreter. The idea here is that we want to bring the concept of relevance into the picture: potential demonstrata are the objects the speaker might have reasons to demonstrate given what would be known to all regular (rational, attentive, etc.) participants of the conversational situation.

For instance, in the key scenario, the most likely reason for grasping the bunch of keys while uttering “these” is to demonstrate at least some (but potentially all) keys from the bunch. This is at least the most likely folk psychological generalization regarding the action involving grasping this or that bunch of keys. This is even more transparent if the previous conversation concerned the speaker's plan to return home or the end of the work hour is approaching. But this might be canceled given alternative constraints imposed by the context. In the Venice-beach scenario, the most likely reason for using the pronoun “she” and making the gesture have a certain direction and scope is to single out a person located in that direction within that scope and (at least) looking as having a particular gender. Given that assumption, the candidate for a demonstratum is every object that satisfies the general constraints. Finally, in the fish scenario, the crucial assumption regarding the context is that the speaker is exploiting a certain convention linking “yea” with a certain abstract object being the length.

The theory of demonstrative utterances that is closest to this interpretation of the idea of pragmatic filter is the coordination account of Jeffrey King (2014). Its main semantic point is that the referent of the demonstrative in the context must meet two conditions: (A) it must be intended as a referent by the speaker, and (B) “a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer” must recognize it as the intended referent (*ibidem*, 225). As far as “a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer” means “the rational interpreter,” the accounts share the common intuition that the speaker must do enough to enable the recognition of the intended object in the context. They differ, however, with respect to the assumption of what counts as “enough”: in King's account, a single object must be recognizable, while in the account sketched in this paper, this applies to potentially numerous classes of objects. Another difference between the accounts is that King talks about the intended referent of the demonstrative, while the account described here talks about the intended demonstratum. The difference might not be visible in regular cases, but in cases involving deferred reference, the two

objects might be different. Additionally, the predictions of King's account and the account sketched in this paper might differ in particular cases. For instance, if there is only one female-looking object within the scope of the gesture, the interpretation sketched above predicts that the reference is secured no matter what the truth-conditional extension of the account looks like (I think that, contrary to King's opinion, this is an intuitive prediction). In cases where the number of objects that count as female-looking is greater than one, the prediction regarding reference depends on the choice of a particular truth-conditional extension of the theory: in the case of weak demonstrativism, for instance, the reference is secured as far as the deictic intention of the speaker matches at least one of the female-looking objects; in the case of strong demonstrativism, the reference is not secured. King's account, on the other hand, predicts that there is no scenario where the reference is secured.

The alternative method of unpacking the idea of pragmatic filter is to appeal to Kaplan's (1989) idea of the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations (FTD) but slightly modify it to enable situations in which the "reference" of a demonstration is not singular. Kaplan (1989) suggested (he abandoned the theory later) that demonstrations can be adequately characterized in terms of the (appropriately extended) Fregean categories of manner of presentation and reference:

(...) the analogy between descriptions (...) and demonstrations is close enough to provide a sense and denotation analysis of the <<meaning>> of a demonstration. The denotation is the demonstratum (...), and it seems quite natural to regard each demonstration as presenting its demonstratum in a particular manner, which we may regard as the sense of the demonstration. The same individual could be demonstrated by demonstrations so different in manner of presentation that it would be informative to a competent auditor-observer to be told that demonstrata were one. (514)

Kaplan discusses several principles that govern the use of demonstrations and enable to establish "isomorphism" between demonstrations and definite descriptions. The most important are (the names of the principles are not due to Kaplan):

### **The Basic Principle**

"A demonstration is a way of presenting an individual" (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

### **The Principle of Non-rigidity**

"It is not required that an occurrence of a demonstration have a fixed content." (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

### **The Principle of Contingent (non-)Emptiness**

“A demonstration which fails to demonstrate any individual might have demonstrated one, and a demonstration which demonstrates an individual might have demonstrated no individual at all.” (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

### **The Detachment Principle**

"A given demonstration might have been mounted by someone other than its actual agent, and might be repeated in the same and different place." (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

### **The Involvement Principle**

"(...) it does seem to me to be essential to a demonstration that it presents its demonstrata from some perspective, that is, as the individual that looks thusly from here now." (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

Some comments concerning the principles are in order. The *Basic Principle* equates demonstrating procedures with ways of presenting demonstrata. It has an easily identifiable analogue in the realm of descriptions: they can also be said to be ways of presenting the things described, ways that exploit properties expressed by the appropriate predicates occurring in the description. It entails, among other things, that the notion of a demonstrating procedure becomes very capacious: it can be applied to all appropriately situated manners of presenting an individual. This consequence is very welcome: the diversity of possible ways of demonstrating something is an empirical fact that must be somehow acknowledged by every adequate theory of demonstratives and demonstrating procedures. FTD offers exactly this: a flexible notion of demonstration and the support for *heterogeneity*.

The *Principle of Non-rigidity* and the *Principle of Contingent (non-)Emptiness* state together that demonstrating procedures might behave like non-rigid definite descriptions that are neither necessarily empty nor necessarily non-empty. This does not, however, rule out cases of rigid demonstration. In fact, our “yea” example belongs precisely to this category (the respective convention warrants that the connection between the distance and the length is fixed across all possible worlds). The *Detachment Principle* and the *Involvement Principle* attempt to draw a demarcation line between essential and contingent properties of demonstrating procedures; the latter attempts also to provide identity conditions for them. Although the *Detachment Principle* says that the place of a demonstration is not essential, while the *Involvement Principle* says that the perspective (which is essential for the demonstrating procedure) involves somehow both time (as here) and place (as now), there is no inconsistency here: the values of here and now are supplemented contextually (Kaplan writes here about setting a demonstration in a context) and,

though determinative for the perspective, are external with respect to it. The *Involvement Principle* applies only to visual demonstrating procedures and uses of perceptual demonstratives, but I see no reason why it could not be extended to other kinds of demonstrating procedures. This would require, of course, a capacious enough idea of “looking thusly” from a certain perspective as well as a detailed analysis of various roles that senses or manners of presentations might play (cf. Zalta, 1988: 154-158). Last but not least, as I have stressed above, we also have to consider another modification of the theory. In order to accommodate the idea of the class of potential demonstrata being numerous, demonstrations should be interpreted here as analogous to indefinite descriptions. This does not require substantial changes in principles governing FTD.

The two interpretations of the idea of pragmatic filter differ with respect to the way they approach the problem of determination of potential demonstrata. Roughly speaking, the interpretation appealing to the idea of a rational interpreter claims that:

(A) An indication  $I$  qua product contributes  $a_1...a_n$  as potential demonstrata in virtue of the link among  $a_1...a_n$ , the beliefs of the rational interpreter  $R$ , and an indication qua action that has  $I$  as its product.

while the FTD-motivated interpretation claims rather that:

(B) An indication  $I$  qua product contributes  $a_1...a_n$  as potential demonstrata in virtue of the link between  $a_1...a_n$  and the properties  $F_1...F_n$  of the indication qua action that has  $I$  as its product.

It is interesting to note here, however, that the two characteristics are not logically exclusive. In particular, one may want to ask what grounds the link between particular properties of an indication and potential demonstrata. And (A) might provide an answer to this question supplementing the 'semantics' of indications (FTD) with the appropriate “metasemantics.” According to such a hybrid approach, the relevant properties qua being responsible for the fact that an indication is associated with a certain manner of presentation have this status because without the properties in question, it would be difficult (potentially impossible) to explain or to make sense of the occurrence of the indication in this particular context.

## 5. Summary

Considerations presented in this paper show, firstly, that demonstration<sub>s</sub> qua actions and demonstration<sub>s</sub> qua products are best conceived as linked respectively to two dimensions of every

demonstrative utterance: the intention to ask the interpreter for an explanation of the action of pointing and the intention to make her guess the intended demonstratum. Secondly, they show that the theory that comprises the distinction can be truth-conditionally developed in several ways, making it compatible with both demonstrativism and (some versions of) intentionalism. Finally, they also show the need of an additional theory explaining how the class of potential demonstrata is determined. As I have suggested above, the explanation might make use of the idea of a rational interpreter of an indication as well as of the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations.

It should be clear, therefore, that *heterogeneity* and the action–product distinction both have an important role to play in the theory of demonstrations and demonstrative utterances. This article was intended to interest the reader in both aspects of ostension. I hope that I have succeeded in at least partially fulfilling this goal.

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