

**Abstract**

The qua problem is an issue for those who want to defend the possibility of purely causal reference grounding; there seems to be no way of determining which of the properties or objects present at the act of dubbing fixes the reference of a new term. In a recent paper, Max Deutsch (2021) argues that there is no qua problem. His argument is the following: we usually agree that things can cause effects *qua* one of their properties and not *qua* others. Given this assumption, we can simply say that an X caused a dubbing act *qua* the relevant property and not *qua* the irrelevant properties, thus fixing the reference of the term; the qua problem has vanished.

I will argue that, unfortunately, the qua problem persists. I will first highlight the disanalogies between a straightforward example of things causing effects *qua* one of their properties and things causing dubbing acts *qua* one of their properties. Unlike in the straightforward case of causation, there is no way to adequately support the conclusion that the dubbing act was caused by a thing *qua* one of its properties. Then, I will show that Richard Miller's 1992 solution – which inspired Deutsch's work – is also unsuccessful. While it resembles the straightforward case of causation more closely, it fails because multiple properties of a thing can cause us to develop different recognitional capacities, reintroducing the qua problem.