

Does a speaker of a language possess *propositional knowledge about meaning*, merely in virtue of her basic competence with the language *alone*? Dummett's answer is yes, and it is motivated by the rationalist idea that it is essential to linguistic activity as such that a competent speaker should be able to rationally control her language use on the basis of knowledge of meaning (cf. Dummett (1996)). Minimalists on semantic competence, such as Devitt (1996, 2004, 2011), argue that the Dummettian-rationalist view is not the default position and requires a substantial defense, because, generally, one's competence in performing a certain activity need not involve propositional knowledge about that activity (e.g. one can play guitar without knowing any music theory). The aim of this paper is to defend the Dummettian-rationalist view by developing an account of how each speaker can derive propositional semantic knowledge from her semantic competence alone. I argue that the speaker's semantic competence alone can put her in a position to explicate the meanings of lexical items in her language by *using* them, and thereby *demonstrating their use* in contexts. I develop a 'pragmatist' account of semantic knowledge by exploiting various features that such speech acts of meaning-explication exhibit. (200 words)