

# The structure of intentionality.

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Between monadic and  $n$ -adic theories, there are different ways of conceiving the structure of intentional acts and their relations with (intentional) objects. Triadic theories are the starting points if one wants to make justice to the aspectual or perspectival character of intentional relations. In this talk, I will address three questions by underlining both their historical and present resonances.

Does aspectuality necessarily require mental representations? Non-representational theories of intentionality answer negatively. Does the use of the notion of “content” for characterizing intentionality commit one to representationalism? Enactive theories of intentionality diverge on this issue. How can one conceive the aspectual character of intentionality without resorting to the idea of “content”? C. S. Peirce offers here interesting resources.

Proposed month for a presentation : January 2023 (two last weeks, or the first two weeks of February 2023)