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Knowing That One Believes Without Knowing That One Knows

The so-called KK principle, which states that if one knows  $p$ , one is in position to know that one knows that  $p$ , had been widely rejected in contemporary epistemology, especially due to the influential anti-luminosity argument presented by Timothy Williamson in his *Knowledge and Its Limits* (2000). In turn, a similar skepticism was voiced against weaker “positive introspection” principles featuring belief or justified belief in place of the knowledge operator (see: Greco 2015). The aim of my paper will be to challenge this consensus and argue that accepting Williamson’s argument does not justify such skepticism.

I shall start by reconstructing Williamson’s anti-KK argument and considering the possibility of adjusting it to other proposed positive introspection principles: BB (Hintikka 1962), KB and BK (Stalnaker 2007). I will argue that such arguments fail with respect to BB and KB principles, but present important obstacles to the BK principle. In turn, they present trouble to views which hold that one is rationally obliged to treat one’s beliefs as knowledge states (e.g., Huemer 2007) or those which define beliefs in terms of “epistemic possibility of knowledge” (Stalnaker 2007). In the end, I shall discuss the attractiveness of upholding some positive introspection principles while rejecting BK and KK, especially in the context of combatting epistemic and doxastic paradoxes such as Moore’s, Anti-Expertise and Dogmatism.