

What' It's Like to Believe

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Epistemic Justification and Chromatic Illumination

What is it like to undergo conscious experiences in which one accommodates frame problem aspects, i.e. what-it's-like to undergo conscious belief fixation in which one accommodates pertinent holistic, Quineian/isotropic aspects of evidence? We claim that such conscious experience involves conscious *appreciation* of pertinent background considerations, which are not conscious *representations* of those experiences -- aspects of conscious experience we call *chromatic illumination* by such information. Chromatic experiential evidentialism is proposed as an account of epistemic justification.

Teleological Structure of Belief Fixation

We understand belief fixation to consist of four means-to-ends levels: reliable veridicality, objective rationality, sensibility based subjective rationality, and experiential subjective rationality: believing only what accords with one's all-in, responsible seeming, ultima facie, epistemic seemings. This is an inclusivist pluralist proposal, with teleological and deontological aspects of epistemic evaluation. Some lessons about epistemic virtuousness are spelled out.

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Henderson, D., Horgan, T. & Potrč, M. (2020). Morphological Content and Chromatic Illumination in Belief Fixation. In A. Ness & T. Chan (Eds.), *Inference and Consciousness* (pp. 229-252). New York and London: Routledge.