

## Remarks on Frege's theory of communication

### Abstract

It is a commonplace of the philosophy of language that Frege's pragmatics, understood as a theory of communication, responds to the conception generally dubbed the "code," "message," or "transmission" model, according to which successful communication requires the identity between the thought expressed by the speaker in uttering a sentence and the thought grasped by the hearer. There is also a general consensus on the fact that indexicals and demonstratives pose singular problems for his theory of meaning as sense and reference; problems that philosophers of language and mind have been trying to solve by proposing various Fregean, neo-Fregean or directly non-Fregean accounts. The aim of this work is to shed some light on Frege's theory of communication by discussing the specific problems that proper names, indexicals and demonstratives pose to (pure or impure versions) of the transmission model and the role that Frege might have envisaged for a logically perfect language.