

## Reference of episodic memories within the simulationist framework

Recent empirical advancements in the science of memory have put significant pressure on the classic causal philosophical account of episodic memory, which requires that, for a subject to remember a given episode, the subject's current representation must be causally connected to the original experience of the event in a non-deviant way. This development has led to the gradual abandonment of the classic causal account. One view that has emerged from this shift is *simulationism*, whose most central characteristic, in the context of my talk, is the rejection of the causal connection condition. However, abandoning this condition introduces the issue of how to account for which event a given episodic memory is about, or, in other words, to which event the memory *refers*, without appealing to the mentioned causal connection. This is potentially problematic because prominent supporters of simulationism are committed to the reliability of a normally functioning episodic memory faculty, and assessing this reliability seems to require a mechanism that addresses the reference question. In my talk, I will examine whether simulationists' commitment to memory reliability indeed necessitates a non-deflationary answer to the reference question.

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Preferred time: not sooner than a couple of months from now