

Title: Integrating Contemporary Perspectives on Lying into the Theory of Assertoric Content

It was realized decades ago by Relevance Theorists that the Gricean notion of narrowly construed “what is said” is a poor candidate for providing us with an account of assertoric content, i.e. of that which constitutes the intuitive content of assertions.

Unfortunately, the Relevance Theoretic concept of explicature which was supposed to improve upon this is not devoid of shortcomings either. Recent literature on assertoric content shows persuasively that intuitive contents of assertions span over several meaning categories.

In my talk, I wish to present a novel theory of assertoric content that ties together recent advancements from the literature on this topic with those from the literature on lying. The view I arrive at, which I call the *first-fill* theory, posits that assertoric content can be constituted by the assertoric utterance’s literal content, its explicature, or by its substitutive implicature, as these implicatures were recently argued to be possible vehicles of lying, and as I take lying that p to be sufficient for p to be asserted. Given that more than one of these types of meanings can be conveyed as a result of a single utterance, my view also incorporates a selection mechanism.