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*Potentially fallacious arguments within the Interpretation as Abduction
framework.*

1. Introduction

This paper aims to prove that the Interpretation as Abduction framework is the most adequate supplement of the pragma-dialectical model since it allows for a comprehensive analysis of potentially fallacious arguments in naturally occurring discussions. The interest in the project evolved out of a need to provide a complete report and evaluation of the pragma-dialectical model designed as a tool for the study of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes. Although certain aspects of the model have already been evaluated by different scholars, no complete assessment and extension of the model has been offered (cf. Walton 1995).

The pragma-dialectical model, complex as it might be, is not an entirely appropriate tool for the study of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes. It appears to be clear, however, that certain principles and standards of argumentation are properly articulated in the model. We agree with Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984), who are originators of the pragma-dialectical theory, that certain principles of argumentation need to be formalised for a more thorough study of naturally occurring discussions. We also share Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1984) idea that an adequate tool for the study of naturally occurring discussions cannot be a haphazard amalgam of different theories on argumentation. Without a doubt, Eemeren, Grootendorst and Houtlosser's idea to create an ideal template of a well-ordered critical discussion in which rhetorical, dialectical and pragmatic functions are precisely determined is an appropriate point of departure. We believe, however, that the pragma-dialectical enterprise cannot be offered an altogether positive evaluation as it seems that the choice of pragmatic functions of the model exercised by pragma-dialecticians continues to be selective.

Realising that semiotics is superordinate to other linguistic branches, we wish to emphasise that a reliable framework for the analysis of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions should first of all be semiotically adequate. Therefore, taking into account the above, we will first attempt to define the concept of fallacy. Two perceptions of the concept

will be presented; the standard and pragma-dialectical treatment of fallacies. The pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion will also be presented. Second, the nature of a semiotically adequate framework will be focused upon. Third, it will be explained why semiotically adequate framework cannot exclusively rely on the standard and pragma-dialectical perception of fallacies. It will be shown why the pragma-dialectical framework is not semiotically adequate and why the introduction of the Interpretation as Abduction framework is therefore necessary. The features of the Interpretation as Abduction framework will be described in detail. Third, the relation between semiotically adequate framework which encompasses syntactics, semantics and pragmatics and the Interpretation as Abduction framework will be drawn. The enhanced form of the pragma-dialectical model, supplemented by the Interpretation as Abduction framework, will eventually be presented and critically evaluated.

2.The standard and pragma-dialectical treatment of fallacies

The standard definition of fallacy as “an argument that seems to be valid but is not” has recently been replaced by pragma-dialectical definition which describes fallacies as “deficient moves in argumentative discourse” (Eemeren 2001: 135).

The concept of fallacy was already described by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. Both ‘contentious arguments’ and ‘deductively invalid demonstrative syllogisms’ are treated by Aristotle as fallacies. He ([1955]: 17) defines contentious arguments as those “which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted.” Each ‘sophistical refutation’ is treated by Aristotle ([1955]: 17ff) as a ‘contentious argument’.¹ Aristotle ([1955]: 17,25) distinguishes between two kinds of refutations, the ones which are dependent on language (in dictione) and the ones which are independent of language (extra dictionem). ‘Equivocation’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘combination’, ‘division’, ‘accent’ and ‘form of expression’ are dependent on language. ‘Arguments connected with accident’, ‘arguments in which an expression is used absolutely, or not absolutely but qualified as to manner or place or relation’, ‘arguments connected with ignorance of the nature of refutation’, ‘arguments connected with the consequent’, ‘arguments connected with the assumption of original point to be proved’, ‘arguments which assert that what is not a cause is a cause’ are independent of language.

¹ Aristotle ([1955b]: 17ff) describes sophism as a futile argument designed only to trick an opponent .

The Aristotelian notion of ‘invalid demonstrative syllogism’ was, according to Hamblin (1970 [1993]: 194), adopted by Cassiodorus who lived in the sixth century A.D. and described as formal fallacy. The concept of formal fallacy was subsumed under the following categories by the twentieth century scholars: ‘affirming the consequent’, ‘denying the antecedent’, ‘the fallacy of equivocation’, ‘the fallacy of rearranging operators’, ‘composition and division fallacies’ (cf. Walton 1995: 69-90, Hamblin 1970 [1993]).”

The concept of informal fallacy, which is also rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, appears to be more differentiated than the concept of formal fallacy. The reason for it is twofold. First, there is no agreement between scholars on the number of informal fallacies. Second, the term ‘informal fallacies’ is not systematically applied by all scholars (cf. Fischer 1971, Walton 1989). The major contribution in the development of the concept of informal fallacy was made by John Locke in the seventeenth century. Lock (1680 [1961]) drew up a list of so-called ‘ad fallacies.’ In the XX century, informal fallacies, known before as special techniques to deceive an opponent, started to be perceived as unreasonable arguments independently of context of dialogue (cf. Eemeren et al. 1996: 61). The list of informal fallacies comprises: ad hominem, ad baculum, ad populum, ad misericordiam, ad ignorantiam, ad verecundiam, complex question, begging the question, hasty generalisation, slippery slope, false cause, straw man, argument from consequences, faulty analogy, ignoratio elenchi and linguistic fallacies².

The concept of formal and informal fallacies was adopted by the Amsterdam School of pragma-dialectics in 1992. Rob Grootendorst and Frans H. van Eemeren, the main representatives of the school, designed the ideal model of critical discussion in which a dispute is externalised. The ideal model, as presented below, comprises four stages, namely confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion stage.

Confrontation stage	The externalisation of a dispute (stage 1)
1.1	Language user 1 advances a positive or negative point of view in respect of expressed opinion O
1.2	Language user 2 casts doubt on this view
Opening stage	The decision to conduct an argumentative discussion (stage 2)
2.1	Language user 2 challenges language user 1 to defend his point of

² See Hamblin (1993) for the description of the particular fallacies.

	view in respect of O
2.2	Language user 1 accepts the challenge from language user 2
2.3	Language user 1 and language user 2 decide on an attempt to resolve the dispute by means of discussion
2.4	Language user 1 and language user 2 decide who is to take the role of protagonist and who the role of antagonist in the discussion
2.5	(Language user 1 and language user 2 agree the rules of discussion to be followed)
2.6	(Language user 1 and language user 2 agree when they will regard the discussion as concluded)
Argumentation stage	The advancing of argumentation and reaction to it (stage 3)
3.1	The protagonist advances argumentation in defence of his view
3.2	The antagonist reacts to the protagonist's argumentation by casting doubt on the constellations (or on parts of the constellations) of statements that constitute the argumentation or on the justificatory or refutatory potential of those constellations, or by accepting the argumentation
(3.3)	(The protagonist advances new argumentation in defence of his standpoint)
(3.4)	(The antagonist reacts to the protagonist's new argumentation by casting doubt on the constellations (or on parts of constellations) of statements that constitute the argumentation on the justificatory or refutatory potential of those constellations, or by accepting the argumentation
(3.5)	(etc.)
Concluding stage	Determining how the discussion ends (stage 4)
(a)	The dispute is resolved in the protagonist's favour
(b)	The dispute is resolved in the antagonist's favour
(c)	The dispute is unresolved but the discussion is terminated (perhaps pro tem)

(after Eemeren – Grootendorst 1984: 88)

The model is characterised by special rules for rational behaviour, known also as ‘Ten Commandments’:

Rule (1) Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints.

Rule (2) A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so.

Rule (3) A party's attack on a standpoint/argument must relate to the standpoint/argument that has indeed been advanced by the other party.

Rule (4) A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.

Rule (5) A party may not disown a premise that has been left implicit by that party or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party.

Rule (6) A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.

Rule (7) A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.

Rule (8) A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.

Rule (9) A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint.

Rule (10) A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.

(Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208f)

Within the pragma-dialectics, the possible violations of the rules are related to standard definitions of formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies such as affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent, the fallacy of composition, the fallacy of division violate rule 8 of critical discussion while the formal fallacy of equivocation violates rule 10 of a critical discussion. Informal fallacies violate all other rules for rational conduct. In the pragma-dialectical theory, the violations of rules (1)-(9) are restricted to particular stages of a critical discussion. Violations of rule 1 are said to occur in the confrontation stage, violations of rule 2 in the opening stage, violations of rules (3)-(8) in the argumentation stage, violations of rule 9 in the concluding stage.

It is maintained that the discovery of certain pragmatic and dialectical features in a naturally occurring discourse with an externalised dispute is possible if an analyst follows the guidelines offered by the pragma-dialectical ideal model (Eemeren -- Grootendorst 1984: 75ff, 1992: 34ff). The model performs thus both heuristic and critical function. The perception of the model of a critical discussion as a series of guidelines emphasises its heuristic function. The evaluation of argumentative moves in terms of their contribution to the resolution of a dispute pertains to the critical function of the model (cf. Eemeren – Grootendorst 2004: 58f). According to Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), each ideal discussion should aim at resolution of a dispute. The achievement of the pragma-dialectical goal is hampered if a rule for rational conduct is not observed. Thus, each non-resolution oriented move is considered fallacious when studied within the template of a critical discussion. The critical function of the ideal model does not only reflect Toulmin's concept of critical reasoning, but also "the

Socratic ideal of subjecting everything one believes in under a dialectical scrutiny” (Eemeren – Grootendorst 2004: 57). The performance of the critical function allows thus, according to pragma-dialecticians, to trace the contradictory and supposedly fallacious statements.

3. The nature of a semiotically adequate framework

To evaluate the pragma-dialectical framework for the analysis of reasonableness naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes within the standards of semiotic adequacy, one has to first specify the domain of semiotic studies. The positions adopted by the most influential semioticians, Thomas Albert Sebeok, Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles William Morris, Sydney MacDonald Lamb, Jerzy Pelc, John Langshaw Austin, John R. Searle, Roland Barthes, Algridas Julien Greimas, Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Trolle Hjelmslev, Andre Martinet, prove that the scope of semiotics refers in fact to a network of perspectives associated with sign-and/or-meaning-related qualities and the concept of sign-processes. Semiotics manifests itself in different domains and as objectum formale involves different definitional systems. A semiotically adequate framework for the analysis of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes is clearly not to be rooted in all the basic concepts of the particular semiotic approaches. Since it touches upon the interdisciplinary theory of communication, it needs to be based on these semiotic terms and categories which belong to the systems describing interpersonal communication, taking into account the process of interpretation. Understood as such, it relies firmly on the positions represented by Morris, Pelc, Barthes, and Greimas (see also Wąsik 2003).

Taking into account the above, it appears obvious that the pragma-dialectical framework as a construct for the evaluation of reasonableness of argumentative moves lacks the primary semiotic properties of human communication. First and foremost, it does not distinguish between various meaningful patterns of interaction. Despite the claims of its authors (Eemeren et al. 1996: 283ff, Eemeren – Grootendorst 2004: 158ff), the model focuses to a great extent on the standard treatment of fallacies. Although the function of the ideal pragma-dialectical model is not the description of speech events as they really are, the exclusion of the inferential processes which take place in actual argumentative practice makes the model deficient. Clearly, an extension of the pragma-dialectical framework is needed if it is to be semiotically efficient.

4. The significance of abduction in a semiotically adequate framework

Since syntactics, semantics and pragmatics are treated as central to semiotics (Morris 1938/1971, see also Levinson 1983), semiotic efficiency of an ideal model should be measured in relation to them. Pragmatics, as Morris (1971) points out, is concerned with the study of “relation of signs to interpreters” and thus appears to be the most significant for the evaluation of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions.

The pragmatic aspects of the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation are concerned with its normative qualities. Therefore, they are restricted only to those features which do not go beyond articulation of the normative standards of reasonableness. The model takes into account: felicity conditions for successful expression of a speech act with an argumentative illocutionary force formulated on the basis of the Searlean speech act theory (1969, 1979), a version of the Gricean cooperative principle (1975), logical presumptions advocated by Jackson and Jacobs (1983). It assumes that speech acts should be expressed in agreement with presumptions and expectations of the other party. As it pertains to “ (...) a typicalised stock of knowledge and a functionally restricted system of relevancies” (Eemeren et al. 1993: 6), the presumptions and expectations of the other party are determined by the typicalised circumstances.

Pragma-dialecticians realise, however, that ordinary disputants are never perfectly rational in their presumptions and expectations. Nevertheless, they believe that the idealised assumptions on rationality may serve as a framework for evaluation of reasonableness of speech acts in naturally occurring discussions. In the ideal model of a critical discussion, the pragmatic standards of rationality of speech acts are determined by Grice's cooperative principle (1975) and Jackson and Jackobs' logical presumptions (1983). Grice's cooperative principle (1975) is an instruction for the cooperative behaviour: “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” Jackson and Jackobs' logical presumptions, namely, the presumption of mutual awareness and mutual dependency and the presumption of joint activity are elaboration on the cooperative principle in terms of “the direction of the talk exchange.” The presumption of joint activity refers to Goffman's idea of ‘working consensus’ (1959: 10) which is associated with reaching a common decision on “the direction of the talk exchange.” According to the presumption of joint activity, speakers are to jointly decide on “the direction of the talk exchange”, when they assume the roles of a protagonist or an antagonist. The presumption of mutual awareness and mutual dependency is manifested in the

cooperation between disputants who systematically aim at the achievement of the common goal. In case of a critical discussion, the common goal is resolution of a dispute. According to Jackson and Jackobs (1983), the logical presumptions pertain to the values of sincerity, efficiency, relevance and clarity which also give rise to the Quality Maxim, the Quantity Maxim, the Relation Maxim and the Manner Maxim proposed by Grice (1975). The maxims are designed to prohibit the speech acts which are insincere, unmotivated, unnecessary, pointless or incomprehensible within the structure of a rational conduct.

Due to the normative qualities of the pragma-dialectical framework, the Gricean conception of possible violations and flouting of the conversational maxims (the Quality Maxim, the Quantity Maxim, the Relation Maxim and the Manner Maxim) is not taken into consideration. Neglecting the significance of pragmatically developed utterances and local and contextual implicatures, pragma-dialecticians reject the main claim of all pragmatic theories that abduction³ is “at the center of any pragmatic account of knowledge incrementation”.⁴ Pragmatically developed utterances, local and contextual implicatures emerging from naturally occurring discussions are, according to Hobbs (2006), products of abductive reasoning. The reason for the apparent rejection of the concept of abduction may be concerned with its subjective evaluation of meanings. However, it should be noted that in natural language study, as Walton (2004) emphasises, objectivity comes from subjectivity. The process objectivisation assumed by pragma-dialectics is thus detached from the actual processes of meaning emergence.

The above considerations point to the fact that the pragma-dialectical model relies to a great extent on the coding/decoding model.⁵ The characteristic features of the coding/decoding models such as unidirectionality and fixed meanings are adopted by pragma-dialecticians. Although they talk about complex relations between arguments, the effects of the relations are considered to be unidirectional. They are perceived only as contributions or non-contributions to resolution of a dispute. In contrast, in pragmatics, the effects of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes may be characterised by

³ Abduction is one of the three kinds of reasoning distinguished in contemporary literature on linguistics (cf. Hobbs 2006). The two other kinds of reasoning are induction and deduction. Hobbs (2006: 727) states that “In deduction, from P and $P \rightarrow Q$, we conclude Q . In induction, from P and Q , or, more likely, a number of instances of P and Q together with other considerations, we conclude $P \rightarrow Q$.” If we can observe Q and we know that $P \rightarrow Q$, then we can abductively conclude that “ P must be the underlying reason that Q is true” (Hobbs 2006: 727, see also Melrose 1994: 493f). In other words, in abduction P is assumed because it provides explanation for Q . Pragmatically developed utterances, local and contextual implicatures emerging from naturally occurring discussions are, according to Hobbs (2006), products of abductive reasoning.

⁴ The quotation comes from Givón (2005: 205f).

⁵ Lasswell’s model (1948), Shanon and Weaver’s model (1949), Gerbner’s model (1956), Jakobson’s model (1960), and Berlo’s model (1960) are the best known coding/decoding models of communication.

multidirectional effects (cf. Jacobs et al. 1991: 58). The pragma-dialectical violations of the Ten Commandments do not relate to dynamic and transient development of meaning but rather to the determination of once formed meanings. Contrary to the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion, in the naturally occurring discussions, utterances are perceived sequentially, multidirectionally, dynamically and transiently (cf. Walton 1995, Jackson 2007). All these features point to subjective rather than objective perception of meanings. Simultaneously, they are characteristics of an inferential model of communication.

Bearing in mind all the above considerations, we state that the basic assumption of pragma-dialectics to have its roots in the coding/decoding models of communication is questionable. As mentioned above, we believe that the standard model should be inspired by naturally occurring discussions (see also Jacobs -- Jackson 1983: 286, Walton 1995: 22). We do not discard the fact the notions differentiated in pragma-dialectics are adequate tools for the indication of a disagreement space. Since they point to the externalisation of a disagreement space through the specification of types of disputes, standpoints of disputants, stages of a dispute and instances of complex relations resulting from introduction of counterarguments, they allow for appropriate organisation of the structure and the content of an argumentative discourse. However, as shown above, potentially fallacious arguments should be studied abductively, that is taking into account local and contextual implicatures derived from them. Only then should the potentially fallacious moves be referred to real and virtual standpoints of disputants, stages of a dispute, type of a dispute. Clearly, thus, the pragma-dialectical model need to be supplemented by a framework for the study of abductive reasoning.

It must be emphasised that abduction as the ‘cognitive backbone’ of the pragma-dialectical theory may not use the apparently simplified forms of reasoning applied in computer science and artificial intelligence.⁶ Although in both of the disciplines abduction eventually reaches a sophisticated form of reasoning, it does not account for plurality of strong and weak implicatures emerging from naturally occurring discussions produced by human beings. Neither does presumptive reasoning characterising legal discourses clarifies the process of reasoning in naturally occurring discussions. It is therefore reason to implement Hobbs et al.’s (1993) Interpretation as Abduction framework, which centers on the multi-aspect reasoning of human beings in the pragmatic environment, into the pragma-dialectical template. Clearly, we do not discard the fact that computer science and artificial intelligence

⁶ For different schemes representing reasoning in computer science and artificial intelligence, see Reed and Grasso (2007: 1ff), and Reed et al. (2007: 87ff).

opt for multiple effects. Without a doubt, the multi-agent reasoning applied in computer science and artificial intelligence points to multi-directional outcomes (cf. Budzynska – Kacprzak 2006: 162ff). The multi-agent reasoning assumes in advance the possible ways to achieve the pre-planned outcomes. However, in naturally occurring discussions, the outcomes even if pre-planned may also change during the process of discussion (cf. Jacobs et al. 1991: 58). Therefore, contrary to multi-agent reasoning, the reasoning in naturally occurring discussions takes into account the local and global goals of disputants and their possible alternations.

5. The Interpretation as Abduction framework

The framework of ‘Interpretation as Abduction’ (IA) designed by Hobbs et al. (1993) allows for the analysis of pragmatic processes, both local and global, and proves that they are based on abductive reasoning. The IA framework incorporates the following processes:

Proving the logical form of the sentence, together with the selectional constraints that predicates impose on their arguments, allowing for coercions, merging redundancies where possible, making assumptions where necessary (Hobbs 2006: 732).

“Proving the logical form of the sentence, together with the selectional constraints that predicates impose on their arguments” pertains to the pragmatic processes which strengthen a proposition.⁷ These processes, Hobbs (2006: 732) maintains, take place because an utterance rests on mutual beliefs of a speaker and a hearer, speaker’s own beliefs and hearer’s own beliefs.

Hobbs (2006: 739) underlines that ‘pragmatic strengthening’ is based on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and argues that the relevance theory should be incorporated into IA. It should be noted, however, that in light of Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory, Hobbs (2006) would rather talk about ‘mutual manifestations’ than about ‘mutual beliefs’ of a speaker and a hearer⁸.

The processes described above contribute to interpretation of an utterance by both a participant in a conversation and an analyst of the conversation. Hobbs (2006: 735) underlines that the first step to adequate interpretation of an utterance is to see the conversation as “a coherent segment of discourse conveying some situation.” This should be carried out by the

⁷ The detailed description of pragmatic processes such as reference assignment, disambiguation, free enrichment, saturation which strengthen a proposition can be found in Carston (2002).

⁸ See Sperber and Wilson (1986) for the distinction between ‘mutual manifestations’ and ‘mutual beliefs’.

recognition of coherence relations (e.g., a causal relation). Recognition of coherent relations requires taking into account both the informational and intentional content of the discourse. Informational account of the discourse is a product of pragmatic strengthening of a proposition. Intentional account of the discourse is a product of conversational implicature and presupposition. In case of a hearer, consideration of intentional account relates to adopting a certain cognitive position. The implicature which arises is thus a result of taking into account speaker's intention. Both pragmatic strengthening and emergence of an implicature are products of abductive reasoning⁹.

6. The enhanced form of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion

The Interpretation as Abduction framework assumes the existence of other goals than are distinguished in pragma-dialectics. Manifestly, the abductive form of reasoning goes beyond the global, pre-planned goals. Contextual nature of abductive reasoning relies also on the emergence of standing concerns. As Jacobs et al. (1991: 58) states, 'standing concerns' are "virtual plans, goals and demands that are continually in the offing and that emerge in locally relevant ways."

In contrast, pragma-dialecticians talk only about the pre-planned dialectical goal of resolution of a dispute and the pre-planned rhetorical goal of launching the most effective attack pursued in the argumentation stage and do not mention standing concerns of speakers. Hobbs (2006)'s claims are, however, closer to the actual argumentative practice than the claims of pragma-dialecticians. Therefore, we state that the account of reasonableness of argumentative moves should be studied in relation to the three orientations, deepening the insight, launching the most effective attack and resolution of disagreement treated either as main and pre-planned goals or standing concerns.

The goal of deepening the insight into speaker's own or the other party's position is often described in literature as pertaining to the 'maieutic function'¹⁰ of a dialogue. Clearly, the maieutic function allows "to gain an increased understanding or insight into the basis of [participant's] position as the dialogue progresses" (Walton 1995: 20).

The maieutic function of a dialogue is also included in another version of a prototypical dialogue known as the Waltonian persuasion dialogue which is an enhanced

⁹ See Carston (2002) for the explanation of the distinction between the process of pragmatic strengthening and the emergence of an implicature.

¹⁰ The term 'maieutic' is derived from the Greek word *maieutikos* which means "skill in midwifery". It relates to the skill of Socrates who helped "in the birth of new ideas" conducting a philosophical dialogue with another party. The party who was questioned by Socrates was assumed to express new ideas (Walton 1995: 103).

version of a pragma-dialectical critical discussion. It should be indicated here, however, that the Waltonian persuasion dialogue is not a construct which allows for the analysis of standpoints, types of disputes, stages of a dispute as a critical discussion does. Its main focus is the extension of the number of goals pragma-dialecticians take into account.

It should also be noted that according to the Waltonian persuasion dialogue, resolution of a dispute is not always the global actual goal of speakers. It is especially the case in non-mixed discussions¹¹ in which only one speaker advances argumentation while the other speaker expresses challenges or doubts. Since one of the speakers in a non-mixed discussion does not offer any argumentation, we can only assume that his virtual standpoint opposes the standpoint of the other party. Therefore, the common global goal of resolution of a dispute is possible but not actual.

The Waltonian persuasion dialogue emphasises also that if in the mixed discussions the rhetorical aim of launching the most effective attack overrides the dialectical aim of the resolution of a difference of opinion, then an argument is not necessarily fallacious. Launching the most effective attack may not take into account resolution of a dispute. It may, however, be exercised, as Walton (1995, see also Walton – Godden 2005: 273ff) emphasises, to increase an insight into a speaker's own and the other party's position. Therefore, in contrast to the pragma-dialectical model, the persuasion dialogue suggests that the relation between the goals should not be considered unidirectionally but multidirectionally. In addition, in the Waltonian dialogue a clear distinction is drawn between the common goal of speakers and their individual goals. A starting point of the ideal model of a critical discussion is the idea that speakers pursue the same goal. Pragma-dialecticians (Eemeren – Houtlosser 2006) do not assume that the individual goals of speakers may differ. Therefore, the Waltonian persuasion dialogue develops the pragma-dialectical model from two perspectives, the perspective of the plurality of goals and the perspective of the individual goals.

Walton (2006: 756) emphasises also that the concept of explanation or clarification may come to slide into a dominant position in the discourse studied within the model of the persuasion dialogue. In such a case, the model of an examination dialogue should be applied as a tool for analysis. The model of the examination dialogue complies with Hobbs' Interpretation as Abduction framework as it focuses on the exegetical function of a dialogue. Two goals are established in the examination dialogue by Walton (2006: 772): the 'goal of the

¹¹ A non-mixed discussion is a discussion in which only one speaker advances argumentation while the other speaker challenges him. In mixed discussion, both disputants put forward arguments (Eemeren – Grootendorst 1984).

extraction of information' and the 'goal of the testing of reliability of this information'. It is assumed that in the ideal model of an examination dialogue shifts from 'an argument mode' to a 'clarification mode' may frequently occur in contributions of both speakers. Clearly, the three ideal models, namely, the pragma-dialectical critical discussion, the Waltonian persuasion dialogue and the Waltonian examination dialogue, are designed for the analysis of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes. However, only the Waltonian persuasion dialogue is characterised by the features of an examination dialogue and a critical discussion in terms of goals. It must be noted, however, that if in actual argumentative practice only goals associated with one specific model are pursued, then the discourse should be analysed as an examination dialogue or a critical discussion. However, if multiple common or individual goals are established by speakers, then we believe that the Waltonian persuasion dialogue should be applied as template for the study of the goals in naturally occurring discourse. Only then will the argumentative moves be evaluated more comprehensively than the pragma-dialectical contribution/non-contribution to resolution of a dispute suggests.

As mentioned above, the Waltonian persuasion dialogue attempts to develop its prototype, that is the ideal pragma-dialectical model. It must be noted, however, that the Waltonian persuasion dialogue is not a substantial advancement in the creation of an appropriate framework for the analysis of naturally occurring discussions. Clearly, it reflects upon the potential plurality of the goals of disputants. However, it does not mention that the thorough examination of the meanings emerging from the discourse can be carried out only if the persuasion dialogue is broadened by the pragmatic theory of relevance.

According to the theory of relevance (Sperber – Wilson 1986), the search for relevancy is always carried out through the ostensive behaviour of speakers, i.e., the behaviour which is inferrable for participants in a discussion. Following this line of reasoning, we assume that the ostensive behaviour in naturally occurring discussions becomes evident through the maximization of the multiplication effect. The multiplication effect refers to the combination of the already and previously advanced arguments. Sperber and Wilson point out (1986: 48) that the greater the combination of old and new premises, the greater the relevance of the new premises. Therefore, we claim that in naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes, the new and old premises should be always combined to clarify the content of a particular standpoint. In other words, they should be combined to provide reasons for advancing a particular standpoint. The process of clarification of a standpoint is 'productive' in the sense that it yields positive cognitive effects which improve the knowledge

the disputants or the analyst already possess. In other words, the process verifies the available assumptions.

Without a doubt, however, supplementation of the pragma-dialectical framework by the Interpretation as Abduction framework which through the maieutic function' relates to the Waltonian persuasion dialogue leads to the creation of a semiotically valued construct. It turns out also that other inherently pragmatic accounts such as the Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean approaches to the interpretation of an utterance meaning and the relevance theory are characterised by abductive reasoning and thus can be integrated into the Interpretation as Abduction framework. Despite the fact that Hobbs (2006) includes only the Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean accounts and relevance theory into the Interpretation as Abduction framework, this paper clearly shows that abduction in its pragmatic dimension is also included in the Waltonian persuasion dialogue.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, it is claimed that despite the coverage of certain aspects concerning the pragmatic functions of argumentation in the pragma-dialectical model, it is not an entirely appropriate tool for the study of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions. Our point of departure was that the idea that a violation of a rule of the critical discussion poses an obstacle to realisation of the dialectical goal of resolution of a dispute cannot be, as it is in pragma-dialectics, the only criterion for the fallaciousness/non-fallaciousness dichotomy. The semiotic value of such a model is clearly diminished.

Building on the above considerations, we claimed that some additional criteria for the evaluation of reasonableness of argumentation should be added to the pragma-dialectical template that would still allow for the pragma-dialectical dialogical conception of argumentation but would also take into account the non-monotonic nature of inferences. To increase the semiotic efficiency of the model, we emphasised that argumentation should not be treated as a sequence of theorems which are axiomatically-grounded but a sequence of complex actions.

Therefore, we proposed supplementary criteria for the evaluation of reasonableness of naturally occurring discussions with externalised disputes which focus on inferential processes and possible multiple global goals and standing concerns of disputants. The criteria we took into account show that evaluation of reasonableness of arguments is less straightforward a task than might be expected relying exclusively on the pragma-dialectical model.

We offered Hobbs' Interpretation as Abduction framework as semiotically adequate for the study of emergent meanings which are consequences of inferential processes. We explained why the Interpretation as Abduction framework allows to treat utterances sequentially, multi-directionally, dynamically and transiently and why its inclusion into the pragma-dialectical model improves its analytical adequacy. Drawing the relation between the Interpretation as Abduction framework and the template of persuasion dialogue we showed that the constant emergence of local goals may be referred to embeddings of different types of dialogues in a persuasion dialogue perceived by Walton (1995) as an enhanced version of a critical discussion.

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