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Institutional affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Warsaw University.

1. Principal research interests: Philosophy of language, semantics, pragmatics, early analytic philosophy.

2. Education:

- Ph.D. with Honors, Philosophy, Warsaw University (April 2006).
‘Semantics of Referring Expressions’.
- M.A. with Honors, Philosophy, Warsaw University (June 2001).
‘The Meaning of Sentences with Empty Referring Expressions’.

3. Grants and Awards:

- Distinction for the Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation, Klemens Szaniawski Competition (2006).
- 9 months at the University of Michigan, Fulbright Junior Research Grant (2004/2005).

4. Teaching:

- Analytic philosophy (Institute of Philosophy, in Polish).
- Introduction to Philosophy (Institute of English Language, in English).
- Introduction to Logic (American Studies Center, in English).

5. Major publications:

Books:

- *Semantics of Referring Expressions* (in Polish), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, 2007 (p: 154).

<http://semper.istore.pl/sklep.432,..03..pl-pln.417356.0.html>

In my book I develop a proposal in which names and some descriptions are referring expressions, and I argue that a unified treatment of names and referential descriptions is possible. I offer an account of referential descriptions according to which the predicational content of a description – the noun phrase minus the determiner 'the' (just the *N-bar* in linguistic terminology) – is not part of the semantics proper, but is rather an expression of material that is *conventionally implicated*. I argue that similar considerations apply to the analysis of proper names. Following proposals by Burge (1973), Larson and Segal (1995), I suggest that proper names, like the *N-bar* content of a description, can be thought of as

predicates, but I combine this idea with my proposal for descriptions and argue that name-like predicates do not make it into the semantics proper, but express material that is conventionally implicated.

Articles:

- 'The Meaning of Multiple Quantified Sentences' (in Polish), *Filozofia Nauki* 1/2009, forthcoming.
- 'Quotations and Belief Reports. Quine on Linguistic Metarepresentations' (in Polish), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 4/2008, forthcoming.
- 'Intuitions and Semantic Theory' (in English), *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* 4/2008, forthcoming.
- 'Are Proper Names Exceptional?' (in Polish), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 4/2006.
- 'The Role of Linguistic Intuitions in Russell-Strawson Debate' (in Polish), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 4/2003.
- 'Problems of Designation in Epistemic Contexts' (in Polish), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 1/2003.
- 'The Meaning of Sentences with Empty Referring Expressions' (in Polish), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 2/2002.

Translations:

- Alexius Meinong, *Ueber Annahmen (On Assumptions)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004 (p: 321).

<http://www.marszalek.com.pl/index.php?m=2&ks=1173>

6. Presentations:

- The Role of Intuitions in Semantic Theory, *Workshop on Concepts and Intuitions*, University of Turku, December 13th - 15th 2008
- The Meaning of Multiple Quantified Sentences (in Polish), *Prof. Mostowski's Logic and Cognition Seminar*, Warsaw University, October 2008.
- Language as a Mirror of Reality and as an Instrument of Action (in Polish), *Warsaw Festival of Science*, September 2008.
- Multiple Quantification: Structural or Pragmatic Ambiguity? (in Polish), *VIIIth Polish Philosophical Congress*, Warsaw University, September 2008.
- Intuitions as Metarepresentational Behaviors (in English), *ECAP 6*, Jagiellonian University, August 2008.
- Quotations and Belief Reports. Quine on Linguistic Metarepresentations (in Polish), *Willard Van Orman Quine Conference*, Warsaw University, June 2008.

- Intuitions and Semantic Theory (in English), *Strands of Naturalism. A Conference in Honour of Michael Devitt*, Warsaw University, April 2008 (in the Organizing Committee).
- The Architecture of Meaning (workshop in Polish), *Student Colloquium on Language*, Warsaw University, April 2008 (invited speaker).
- *Semantics Workshop*, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS), October 2007 (participant).
- Can Intuitions Provide a Sound Empirical Base of Linguistics? (in Polish), *Warsaw Festival of Science*, June 2007.
- Referring Expressions and Quantifiers (in English), *Philosophers' Rally '07*, Warsaw, May 2007.
- Hintikka's Thesis and Robert May's Scope Principle (in Polish), *Prof. Mostowski's Logic and Cognition Seminar*, Warsaw University, March 2007.
- Referring Expressions, Conventional Implicatures and the Construction of a Nominal Appositive (in English), *8th Szklarska Poreba Workshop on the Roots of Pragmasemantics (ILLC)*, Szklarska Poręba, February 2007.
- Definite Descriptions in Natural Languages: Philosophical vs. Linguistic Perspective (in Polish), *Semiotic Seminar*, Warsaw University, December 2006.
- Are Proper Names Exceptional? (in Polish), *John Stuart Mill Conference*, Warsaw University, June 2006.
- *Semantics Workshop*, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS), May 2005 (participant).
- *Philosophy and Linguistics Workshop*, University of Michigan, November 2004 (participant).
- The Role of Linguistic Intuitions in Russell-Strawson Debate (in Polish), *Semiotic Seminar*, Warsaw University, December 2003.

7. Professional Duties:

- Member of the Board of *Polish Association of Semiotics* (2005 – present).
- Editorial Board: *Przełąd filozoficzny* (2007 – present).

8. Papers in preparation:

- 'Referential Descriptions and Conventional Implicatures' (in English).

In my paper I develop a proposal in which the predicational material in a referential description is conventionally implicated and not part of the semantics proper. I argue that

existing approaches to referential descriptions are inadequate because they do not correctly account for the full range of facts covering the properties of referential descriptions. On Richards's View (1993), the descriptive element of a referring description contributes to the truth-conditional content of the relevant utterance: 'The (that) F is G' entails (implies logically) 'That (it) is F'. On Braun and Borg's View (1994, 2000), the descriptive element contributes to the Kaplanian character of the relevant utterance: 'The (that) F is G' presupposes (in the Strawsonian sense) 'That (it) is F'. I also argue that referential descriptions should not be identified with Goedelian descriptions: '[The x: x = a and x is F]' (Lepore and Ludwig [2000], Neale [2004]). I think that a very promising alternative would be to regard the predicational content not as material that is part of the semantics of sentences (including both levels: truth-conditional content and character), but rather as material that is conventionally implicated: 'The (that) F is G' implicates conventionally 'That (it) is F'. I also work out the linguistic details of the proposal. I argue that referential descriptions exhibit the structure of a nominal appositive involving the N-bar content and the referential determiner 'the'. Following proposals by Doron (1992) and Potts (2003), I take nominal appositives to form a constituent, and I argue that we have both restrictive and appositive predicates. The restrictive predicates are always anchored to the quantificational determiner, the appositive ones – to the determiner with the semantics of a referring expression. Restrictive predicates serve to restrict the range of a given quantifier. Appositive predicates implicate conventionally their respective material.